This paper is devoted to the analysis of liquidity risk in microfinance. Using the Cox proportional hazard model, we identify variables that impact the risk of a deposit contract to experience an early withdrawal. Using then a re-sampling method, we estimate withdrawal rate distributions for migrants' and locals' deposits. In both cases we use an original database of 7,828 deposit contracts issued between 2002 and 2008 by 12 village banks belonging to a major Malian rural microfinance network (PASECA-Kayes). Cox model results show that the migration status does not affect directly the risk for a contract to default, while this risk increases with the amount deposited and the term of the contract which are on average both higher for migrants compared to non migrants. Re-sampling method results show that migrants tend more than locals to default on their deposit contracts and that deposit at risk are higher when considering migrants' time deposit compared to locals' time deposits. 
I.

Introduction
The dramatic drying-up of liquidities observed during the 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the importance of improving liquidity risk management (see for instance Cornett et al., 2011; Ackermann, 2008) . Banks that relied more heavily on core deposits (i.e. deposits that are unlikely to be withdrawn, even in response to market interest rates and seasonal swings 2 ) and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to banks with higher liquidity risk exposure. As microfinance institutions (MFIs)'s assets are mainly illiquid 3 , in case these institutions find themselves in the same situation as traditional banks during the crisis (scarcity of funds), they should be able to rely on stable sources of funding such as core deposits. Otherwise, as any other financial institution, they may have to deal with a liquidity crisis consequences such as lost of trust from their clients, which may lead, in extreme cases to bank run and collapse of the institution (see for instance Diamond and Dybvig, 2000; Markel Biety, 2005; Carmona, 2007) . This paper focuses on migrants' deposits as a source of core deposit for MFIs or a factor that could reduce their liquidity risk, defined as the danger that a MFI will not meet its obligations: its cash inflows will not meet the demand for cash outflows represented by deposit withdrawals, new loans demand and operating expenses (Markel Biety, 2005) .
Financial institutions (banks) provide liquidity to borrowers in the form of loans and to depositors by making funds available on demand (Cornett et al., 2011) . These functions leave banks vulnerable to increases in demand for liquidity from borrowers as the loans are relatively illiquid assets and demands from depositors may occur at undesirable times, for instance when loan repayments are uncertain (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) . Banks should then set up management tools to prevent themselves against liquidity problems that can, at the 2 Markel Biety, 2005. 3 According to the Micro banking bulletin, in 2008 the ratio Portfolio/Assets = 71.6% for Banks, 78.8% for Credit Unions (CU) and 65.9% for Rural Banks (MIX, 2010) .
extreme, result in runs on banks by depositors. Cornett et al. (2011) suggests four key drivers of liquidity risk management for banks, namely, composition of the asset portfolio or the market liquidity of the assets (when banks require liquidity, they can for instance sell loans, but the market for these loans should then be liquid), core deposits as a fraction of total financial structure, equity capital as a fraction of total financial structure and funding liquidity exposure stemming from loan commitments. In this paper, we focus on core deposits, as deposits are the main source of funding of the MFIs allowed to collect them 4 .
Depositors in MFIs are local people (people who live exclusively in the country where the MFI operate), but also, for MFIs operating in migration zones, migrants (people who also live abroad) who are mainly excluded from the traditional banking system in developing countries and may still not get access to banks in their country of migration. Migrants depositors 5 are expected to behave differently from locals. First, they could be more willing to save at longer term than locals (Ponsot, 2007) and less willing to withdraw their money before the term of their contract. Actually, as unbanked, they valorize the opportunity to have their money stored in a safe place while they are abroad (market surveys indicate considerable demand for formal remittances-based financial services such as deposit facilities, which help cash management) 6 , because it helps them preparing their return (which is one motivation to remit 7 ). This allows MFIs to get access to more resources to fund their loan portfolios. Actually, MFIs manage 4 According to the Micro banking bulletin, in 2008 the ratio Deposits/Assets = 51% for Banks, 61% for CUs and 63.9% for Rural Banks. For the same year, the ratio Deposits/Loans = 66.3% for Banks, 75.9% for CUs and 86% for Rural Banks (MIX, 2010) . 5 Migrants' deposits are defined here as the money migrants put on their own deposit account in a MFI. They then include remittances (money earned abroad and sent back home) but also money they may have earned in their origin country. They do not include remittances migrants may have sent to a family member and that do not arrive on the migrant's account. 6 See for instance Acción (2004 This paper aims at determining whether migrants' deposits actually constitute an opportunity for microfinance as a source of stable funds. Our hypothesis, based on expectations found in this young and limited microfinance literature on remittances, is that migrants are less willing to withdraw their time deposits before term, compared to local depositors.
This hypothesis may not be verified, given what is founded in general literature on deposits withdrawals motives, not specifically related to microfinance. Actually, depositors withdraw their money for many reasons. According to Stanhouse and Stock (2004) , depositors'
propensity to withdraw funds is positively related to the level of market interest rates: at higher interest rates, depositors become more willing to withdraw their deposits because they compare market interest rates to the interest offered by their banks as remuneration for their 8 With a time deposit, the depositor makes a single deposit that cannot be withdrawn for a specified period of time, while demand deposit products allow depositors to deposit and withdraw money whenever they want. Time deposits are remunerated, while demand deposits are not (see for instance Hirschland, 2005) . 9 See Mansoor and Quillin (2007) for literature on migration's determinants. 10 Time deposits are considered as stable until their maturity if their remuneration is competitive and if early withdrawals are not allowed or are severely penalized (Markel Biety, 2005) .
deposits. If various other studies also consider the market interest rates as a factor affecting demand deposits (see Gilkeson et al., 1999 , for more references), it should however be highlighted that depositors can be willing to accept "lower-than-market" rates for many reasons, e.g., switching costs and the value of non-interest services bundled with deposits (see for instance Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; Zephirin, 1994; Ledgerwood, 1999; Wright, 2003) .
Based upon the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) find that depositors punish banks for risky behaviors or discipline banks by withdrawing their deposits. Carmona (2007) argues that early withdrawals reflect business cycle conditions. For instance, unemployed individuals will try to compensate the loss of income by using their assets to smooth out consumption. Gilkeson and Ruff (1996) posit four factors that should influence early withdrawal decisions related to time deposits, namely the reinvestment incentive (a function of the remaining maturity of the deposits, the contractual rate and current market interest rate), the size of the deposits, whether the deposits serve as loan collateral, and the idiosyncratic liquidity needs of the depositor. Gilkeson et al. (1999) show that early deposits withdrawals are motivated in part by the level of reinvestment incentive and by liquidity needs, as, on average, time depositors that withdraw funds early pay a substantial net penalty (they withdraw funds despite a negative reinvestment incentive).
Even if, to our knowledge, there is no literature on withdrawals behavior in microfinance, the motives related to traditional financial institutions clients' behavior quoted above should be applicable to microfinance clients, as their motivations to save are quite similar (business opportunities and remuneration for large depositors, valuation of non-financial services such as having their money in a safe place for the poorest clients 11 ). Taking into account the higher average deposit size of migrants, as well as the fact that the sensitivity to interest or investment opportunities increases with the deposit size, migrants' deposits may then be more volatile than local deposits, which implies a higher liquidity risk in using these funds. A higher average balance also implies a higher volatility of deposits, because, all things equal, migrants can withdraw bigger amounts of money, compared to local depositors.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, thanks to our original database from a Malian microfinance network which give information on migrants and locals time deposits, we are able to empirically test an hypothesis related to the impact of migrants' deposits on MFIs' performances, which is relatively rare in literature on microfinance and remittances (see for instance Orozco, 2008 and Sukadi Mata, 2009 on the links between money transfer activities and deposits mobilized by MFIs). Secondly, we use for the first time the Cox proportional hazard model to identify the variables that have an impact on the probability to have early withdrawals, and we apply for the first time the technique of re-sampling, similar to the one used by Carey (1998) , Schmit (2004) , and Marrez and Schmit (2009) to estimate credit losses respectively in private debt, in the leasing industry, and in a microcredit portfolio, to a portfolio of time deposits to calculate withdrawal rates and deposits at risk.
Cox results suggest that the migration status is not a direct determinant for the probability to have an early withdrawal. However, this probability increases with the amount deposited and the term of the contract which are both higher for migrants compared to non-migrants. The resampling method results suggest that withdrawal rates are not the same for the two categories of depositors observed, namely migrants and locals. We find higher withdrawal rate distributions for migrants than for locals. The value at risk is also higher on migrants' deposits than on locals' deposits. All things equal, migrants' deposits variability is then higher than of locals' deposits. These results are opposite to what we expected from literature, as migrants' deposits tend to increase MFIs' liquidity risk compared to locals' deposits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the database. Section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 provides empirical results while section 5 discusses them.
Finally section 6 concludes.
II. Data
Our database consists of time deposits that were collected by 12 Malian CVECAs 12 belonging to the PASECA-Kayes microfinance network. The CVECAs included in the sample (see Table 1 Over the period considered, flows of time deposits in the 12 CVECAs amounted to 519,790
Euros. 13 The majority of flows of time deposits (85%) are local deposits, while migrants' deposits represent the remaining 15%. The distinction between locals' deposits and migrants' deposits is based on the domiciliation status of the depositor. It is then important to stress that a share of the local deposits is constituted by migrants' remittances. Actually, not all migrants have an account in the CVECA, and some migrants' families report that they receive, either formally or informally, money from abroad, which they put on an account not related to the migrant. However, we cannot correct for this in our database. heterogeneous village banks, especially in terms of size (number of members and total assets), migrants' deposits (ratio "migrants' time deposits over total time deposits"), and age (in months). Gouméra and Dramané are the villages where we find the highest concentration of migrants, with respectively 18% and 17% of members reported as migrants in 2008. They are also the villages with the highest contribution of migrants' deposits to total time deposits of the village bank. the origination date of the contract, the amount deposited, and the term of the contract.
Finally, the third category contains the ex post variable: the date of withdrawal. Following these categories, contracts are given the status "before term" or "at term", for migrants and non migrants clients 16 . for 15% of the total amount deposited during the period). The number of migrants' deposits is increasing with time, while the number decreases by 15% after 2007 for locals. These figures let us suppose that migrants' remittances will gain in importance in the total of the deposits received by the CVECAs of the network, supporting the idea that having a better knowledge of migrants' behavior is in the interest of these banks in order to better evaluate the liquidity risk their deposits may imply. Regarding deposits' terms, Table 2b shows that most of the contracts issued (around 55%) are of 4 to 6 months, followed by 10 to 12 months contracts (30.65%). The major part of the amounts considered (99%) have a term of 12 months at the maximum. Deposits with terms of 4 to 6 months constitute the main part of total deposits (58%), followed by deposits of 10 to 12 months (33%). The main part of migrants' deposits is of 10 to 12 months (58%) and the remaining part is mainly of 4 to 6 months (40%). The proportions are opposite for local deposits (60% are of 4 to 6 months and 30% are of 10 to 12 months). All else equal, a higher proportion of migrants' deposits could then be dedicated to fund 10 to 12 months loans, compared to local deposits (58% versus 30%), which justify the interest on migrants'
remittances as a source of long-term funds for microfinance industry (Ponsot, 2007) . Table 2a also shows that nearly 60% of the deposits are of maximum 6 months, which illustrates the lack of long term resources for the CVECAs. Finally, in terms of early withdrawals, tables 3a and 3b give an overview of these operations, relative to, respectively, the total of contracts issued between 2002 and 2008 (by migration status) and the total of contracts issued each year over the period (with the amounts withdrawn). Table 3a shows that early withdrawals represented 2% of the 9,136 deposits. According to term by migrants for the period considered represents 10% of the total of their deposits, while it represents only 2% for non migrants' deposits.
To sum up, the descriptive analysis of data shows that migrants have deposits of longer term than non migrants (the main part of their deposits are of 10 to 12 months, while the main part of locals' deposits are of 4 to 6 months), and the average amount deposited by migrants is higher than the average of locals (231 Euros for migrants, versus 50 Euros for locals).
Regarding variability, migrants' early withdrawals appear only in the last two years of our database, and their average withdrawal is higher than locals' average withdrawal.
17 By "default" we mean contracts that ends before the contractual term or the occurrence of an early withdrawal III.
Methodology
Our objective is to study the impact of migrants' deposits on two parameters of liquidity risk, namely, the default rate of time deposits contract (by "default" we mean contracts that end before the contractual term) and the deposit at risk (the volume of deposit which is at risk and therefore should not be dedicated to loan funding).
Given the type of information we have, namely, a dummy dependant variable ("default" or given contract to be considered as a default contract at time t, the moment of the withdrawal.
Regarding the measure of the deposits at risk, again given the database, we cannot run a panel data regression to explain the size of withdrawals. Actually, the contracts are not observed from 2002 to 2008, but from the moment it starts (at anytime over the period) to the moment it ends. An alternative that could have been applied is to consider each village bank as an individual, instead of each contract. In this case, we only have 64 observations (12 banks and 7 years of observations), which is really limited. We will then use the technique of resampling to calculate withdrawal rates and deposits at risk. This technique was used by Schmit (2004) to estimate credit losses in the leasing industry, and by Marrez and Schmit (2009) to estimate credit losses in a microfinance portfolio.
Cox proportional hazard model
The Cox model 18 , also known as the semi-parametric proportional hazard model, is a survival model that relates the time that passes before some event occurs as a function of a linear combination of explaining variables (covariates). Our explained variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the withdrawal occurs before the contractual date ("default") and 0 when the withdrawal occurs at or after the contractual date.
We then estimate the following model:
is the hazard function or the probability that a time deposit contract will experience an event (a withdrawal) within a small time interval t + ∆t (or right after the observed lifetime of the contract), given that the contract was not a default contract at the beginning of the interval.
It can therefore be interpreted as the risk of a contract to end at time t (and therefore be considered as a default contract or not).
h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard or the hazard function when all the covariates are zero (the nonparametric part of the model). It is a function of time and is analogous to the intercept in a linear or a logistic regression.
Because the baseline hazard function is not restricted to a specific form, what it is interesting
is the association between the set of explaining variables Xi and the occurrence of the event.
We are then interested in estimating the ß. As explaining variables we use all the information available: client's details (the migration status, our main variable of interest, and the gender of the depositor) and ex ante deposit variables (the amount deposited, the origination and the term of the contract). The ex post variable (date of withdrawal) is used to build the dummy of the event's occurrence for each contract. Coefficients are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood.
Given the literature, we expect the amount deposited to increase the risk of a contract to default, while the migration status may have a positive impact (migrants are more sensitive to market changes, which increases the risk) or a negative impact (migrants valorize the opportunity to have their money stored in a safe place, which reduces the risk of default). By controlling for the year of contracts' origination and end, we want to take into account exceptional events related to each year (for instance contracts issued in 2007 and 2008 may have a higher risk of default than other contracts, all else equal, due to the crisis).
The basic assumption of Cox's model is that the relative hazard or the ratio between hazard rates of the 2 groups of individuals (in our case, default and non default contracts) is constant over the period of observation (as both groups have the same baseline hazard rate). This assumption of a constant relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables is called proportional hazards. This means that the hazard functions for any two individuals at any point in time are proportional. In our model we do not have time-variant variables such as depositors' age, however, we will run a test to assess the respect of the proportional hazard assumption.
Bootstrap calculation of withdrawal distribution
To implement this methodology, the sample is divided into two sub-portfolios: one of time deposits made by migrants, and another one of time deposits made by locals, or non migrant clients. The withdrawal rate for a given sub-portfolio is calculated first as the sum of all the contracts that have failed, divided by the sum of all the contracts issued (first case), and second as the sum of all the amounts withdrawn before the term of the contract 19 divided by the total amount deposited (second case). Sub-portfolio withdrawal distributions are then estimated with a non-parametric re-sampling technique, also known as 'bootstrapping' (Schmit, 2004) . The basic process consists in choosing randomly, with replacement, a portfolio of n deposit contracts for a randomly chosen year. When a non-default contract (when the deposits are withdrawn at maturity) is drawn, the associated withdrawal is zero in both cases, whereas when the draw is related to a default (the depositor withdraws funds before term), the withdrawal is counted in the first case, and the amount withdrawn is indicated in the second case. By dividing the sum of all contracts that have failed with all the contracts issued in the first case, and the sum of all withdrawals with the sum of the amounts deposited in the second case, we obtain the withdrawal rate of that particular bootstrap portfolio. The assumption is that each year has the same probability of being drawn. The process is iterated i times. A single iteration i of the procedure yields a withdrawal rate for a given state of the economy (or a given year). The process is iterated 100,000 times (i = 100,000) in order to obtain 100,000 bootstrap samples and thus 100,000 corresponding withdrawal rates. Using a large number of iterations enables us to obtain a probability distribution of withdrawal rates as a percentage of the total of contracts issued and of the total deposits. By performing the draw procedure in two stages (i.e., drawing first a year, then a portfolio of n deposit contracts), we avoid the understating of withdrawal rates. Otherwise, the combination of withdrawal experiences from different years would lead to a mixture of the underlying systematic factors and hence to over-diversification. The advantage of this method is that it is non-parametric and relies only on observed data (no parametric assumptions need to be made). The final step is the calculation of the average withdrawal rate and the percentiles at 95%, 99.5%, 99.9%, and 99.99% in order to obtain in the first case the contracts which are at risk, and in the second case the corresponding percentage of time deposits which is at risk and thus should not be used to finance loans.
IV. Results
As the majority of deposits contracts have a maximum term of 12 months (98.88% of the contracts), we have excluded from the analysis contracts with maturity of more than 12 months (102 contracts), in order to have a situation close to reality. withdrawn from the database. The database that has been used for simulations includes 7,828 deposit contracts, from which 276 are related to migrants and 3% of deposits are withdrawn before term.
IV.1. Cox results
As our dataset only include the contracts for which we have the origination and the withdrawal date, we do not have censored data. We have run 4 regressions, increasing in the number of covariates, in order to select the one with the best goodness of fit (the highest cstatistic). Hazard ratios are reported in Table 4 . 
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(1) (2) (3) The equation (4), with all the covariates included, have the best goodness of fit. Actually, the Harrell's concordance statistic is 0.7, which is the lower end of the 0.7 ≤ c-statistic < 0.8 range for "acceptable discrimination", using the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) rule-ofthumb.
Before interpreting the results, we have tested for the proportional hazard (PH) assumption for the selected model. The PH assumption was met for the model overall, except for the predictor "Bank = Koussane". 21 To correct for this violation we have stratified the Cox model on this predictor. The assumption was then met both globally (the overall model) and individually for each explaining variable. This model, with a set of explaining variables and one stratification variable, is the final model we will comment (Table 5 ).
Our variable of interest, migration status, is positive but not significant. According to the proportional hazard model, being a migrant does not significantly increase the risk of defaulting on time-deposit contract. However, the amount deposited and the terms of the contract significantly increase the risk of default.
As migrants deposit, on average, higher amount and for longer term than non-migrants, the migration status may be considered has a determinant of the default risk, but in an indirect way. Furthermore, the non significance of the migration status parameter may also be due to the small number of migrants contracts (especially defaulted contracts) compared to the total whole sample. The calculation of default contracts distribution through the bootstrap method may contribute to give a better idea of the contribution of migrants to the risk of default faced by the MFI. Level of significance: *** if P-value =< 0.01; ** if P-value=<0.05; *if P-value=<0.10; Standard error in brackets.
Being a member of a given village bank does not seem to have an impact on the risk of default, except for the village bank Gouthioube and Dramané: being a member in one of these banks significantly increases the risk of default relative to the members of the bank Koussane.
The gender does not significantly impact the risk of default.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the year of issuance as well as the year at which the contract is suppose to end does not significantly affect the risk of default. In other words, a contract issued in 2007 does not face a higher risk of default compared to the contracts issued the other years, all else equal. In the same idea, contracts that were supposed to end in 2008 do not face a higher risk of default compared to those that end another year, all else equal.
The extraordinary event that occurred over the period 2007 and 2008 (the crisis) does not seem to have a direct impact on the risk of default. This is an argument for the bootstrap, as it assumes a stationary process across all the years. Table 6 provides summary statistics on defaulted contracts distributions for each category of depositor. We show the results obtained by running simulations (i = 100,000 iterations) on sub-portfolios of 2,000 contracts overall (n = 2,000). The average expected percentage of contracts that will default is higher for migrants than for locals: 2.24% versus 1.46%. The default rate at the 99.99 th percentile is 16.75% versus 3.1%.
IV.2. Bootstrap results
Comparing contracts at risk
In other words, migrants tend to default (i.e. to withdraw before maturity) more than locals, which increases the liquidity risk of the MFIs that use migrants' deposits to funds their loans portfolio compared to MFIs that do not, all things equal. It is important to highlight that on average the default rates are higher for simulated portfolios than for the actual contracts portfolio. Regarding migrants for instance, 6 contracts over 330 have defaulted or 1.81% of migrants' contracts, while simulated portfolios give 2.24% of defaulted contracts on average.
The underlying risk coming from time deposits to be considered by managers is then actually higher than what is suggested by the descriptive analysis of the data.
This result can be explained by the higher average deposit size of migrants compared to locals, implying that migrants may be more sensitive to the interest rate that is offered by the market than the later, and then more willing to withdraw before term, to take the opportunity of the market. If this argument of deposits volatility has been highlighted in literature on deposits in microfinance (see for instance Markel Biety, 2005) , it seems like it has not been analyzed yet in the literature on microfinance and remittances that only highlight the opportunity of migrants' deposits (more specifically remittances) as a stable resource for MFIs because migrants tend to save for longer terms than locals. Table 7 provides summary statistics on withdrawal distributions for each category of depositor. We show the results obtained by running simulations (i = 100,000 iterations) on sub-portfolios of 2,000 contracts overall (n = 2,000). The average expected percentage of deposits withdrawn early is higher for migrant clients than for locals: 3.84% versus 1.66%.
Comparing values at risk
The withdrawal rate at the 99.99 th percentile is 29.05% versus 14.19%, demonstrating that the value at risk is higher for migrants' than for locals' deposits. In other words, migrants tend to withdraw a higher proportion of their time deposits before their maturity compared to locals, which increases the liquidity risk of the MFIs that use migrants' deposits to funds their loans portfolio compared to MFIs that do not, all things equal. If we focus on 10 to 12 months contracts, which represent 58% of migrants' time deposits, we come to the same conclusion ( The risk on migrants' deposits can be up to 8 times higher than the risk on locals' deposits. In other words, the proportion of migrant deposits that can be used to finance loans, compared to the total of their deposits, is smaller than the one of non migrants, even if MFIs face less early withdrawals from migrants compared to non migrants. Again, this result can be explained by the higher average deposit for migrants compared to locals, implying that migrants may be more sensitive to the interest rate that is offered by the market compared to non migrants, but also by the limited diversification of migrants' deposits compared to non migrants. Actually, in 2007 for instance, through a single operation, a migrant has withdrawn around 60% of the total of early withdrawals of the year (migrants and locals together). When the simulations are run without this big withdrawal, the average value at risk on migrants' deposits decrease to 1.26%, which is smaller than on locals' deposits (the value at risk at the 99.99 th percentile becomes 11.21%). However, we think that it is better to keep this withdrawal in the analysis, as this kind of situation is encountered in reality and should then be considered when evaluating MFIs' risk.
V. Discussion regarding bootstrap results
From the previous section it appears that migrants' deposits are likely to increase MFIs' liquidity risk when they are used to fund loans, compared to locals' deposits, all things equal.
However, given that migrants' deposits are likely to be of longer term than locals' deposits, we can wonder whether migrants' deposits do not provide simultaneously a positive effect on MFIs' liabilities. We then test the impact of migrants' longer term deposits on time deposits' durations of the CVECAs in our database. We want to determine whether the long term of migrants' deposits compensate the negative effect of their early withdrawals on time deposits' duration.
The duration of a financial asset with fixed interest rate is the weighted average maturity of its cash flows. It gives an average time of use of the funds. Each time deposit can be viewed as a zero-coupon bond, which duration is equal to its maturity. The duration of the whole portfolio of time deposit is then the weighted average of the maturity of each deposit contract.
If C is the deposit made by the client, r the interest rate paid monthly by the institution, m the maturity of the contract (in month), then:
P, the value of the portfolio of deposit contracts is equal to the sum of the present values (PV) of the cash flows (capital plus interest) of each contract. N = number of contracts issued during the year considered and 1 the ith contract's cash flows present value (at the 1 st of January of the contract's issuance year; the discount factor is ).
And:
The duration (D) of the portfolio is the sum of each contract maturity, weighted by the contribution of each contract cash flows on the portfolio value P. Table 9 gives the durations (in months) of time deposits portfolios for each year available in our database. We have calculated both theoretical and real durations. The theoretical durations consider that no contract has defaulted while to calculate real durations we have use the observed maturity (i.e.
the contractual maturity is replaced by the maturity at which the deposits have been withdrawn). Finally, we have calculated both theoretical and real durations first without migrants' contracts and second, with migrants' contracts included. This allows us to measure the marginal impact of migrants' deposits on portfolios' durations. From Table 9 we can first say that migrants' deposits have a quite limited marginal impact on deposits durations, either theoretical or real durations. Nevertheless, this impact is positive on average (migrants' deposits add a few days -respectively 3 and 4 days -to deposits' durations). And second, the strongest impact of migrants' deposits occurs in 2007, when these deposits accounted for 27% of time deposits received by the CVECAs. Due to the big migrant's withdrawal which occurred in 2007, the highest difference between the theoretical and the real duration is also observed in 2007 (8 days). In other words, the average longer term of migrants' deposits compared to locals has a positive but quite limited effect on deposits durations and the impact of early withdrawals on the duration exist but it is also limited. However, even when we consider early withdrawals, the marginal impact of migrants' deposits on the duration still positive on average.
It is worth stressing that, as durations consider the weight of each contract in the portfolio's value (the present value of the whole contracts), the overall impact of migrants' deposits on durations could certainly be higher than what observed if we had more migrants' contracts in our database.
VI.
Conclusion
The role of migrants' money, especially remittances, in the microfinance industry has not been fully studied. Existing literature highlights a potential positive effect on the availability of funding resources through more deposits. Migrants' time deposits are expected to be of longer term and more stable (in terms of early withdrawals) than locals' deposits. This assumption had never been tested yet. Using the Cox proportional hazard model and the nonparametric re-sampling technique, we first find that higher the amount deposited and the term of the contract, the higher the risk for the contract to default. And second we find that using migrants' deposits to fund loans actually increase MFIs liquidity risk, compared to using only locals' deposits, all things equal.
We have shown that migrants' tend to default more than locals, which implies a higher percentage of their deposits which is at risk. This result is consistent with the literature on motivations to withdraw deposit, and therefore do not confirm the hypothesis that migrants tend to default less than locals, as they value the opportunity to have their money kept in a safe place while they are preparing their return in their home country. However, as migrants tend to deposit for longer term than locals, through the calculation of durations we have measured to which extend migrants' deposits had anyway a positive impact on MFIs'
liabilities. It appears that migrants' money has a marginal but positive impact on time deposits durations, either when considering early withdrawals, which impacts are very limited, except in 2007 (the worst year in terms of amount withdrawn early).
We are aware that data we used in our research originates from only one microfinance network, and this network is particularly interested in working with migrants; however, the results suggest that there is a real need to assess the opportunity migrants' money represents as a source of (long term) funds for microfinance. According to the CFSI survey on microfinance risk, even if concerns about liquidity have eased considerably (especially compared to 2009 and its financial crisis), many MFIs contributing to the study in Africa and Asia have reported liquidity problems (CFSI, 2011) . Actually, the availability of funds varies among regions and migrants' money, especially remittances, can significantly help MFIs with a limited access to external funds to ease their liquidity constraints. In terms of liquidity risk management, our study suggests that the optimal loans to deposits ratio should be smaller when talking about migrants' deposits compared to locals' deposits. The contribution of migrants' deposits to funds 10 to 12 months loans for instance can be very limited, as the value at risk at the 99 th percentile is nearly of 41%. However, in terms of long term resources, our study suggest that migrants' deposits only increase by a few days in the better case the duration of time deposits' portfolio. The idea that migrants' money may contribute to help
MFIs that are facing lack of medium and long term resources is then questionable.
Beyond the study of migrants' deposits impact on MFIs' liquidity risk, this paper raises the issue of the diversification of funding resources. Actually, the high values at risk associated to migrants' deposits compared to locals' deposits can be explained through the high concentration of migrants' deposits into a small number of depositors. The same problems may then occur if we compare MFIs with their larger part of funds coming from a limited number of funders, to MFIs that have a more diversified base of funders.
By demonstrating that MFIs that receive migrants' deposits are not necessarily better-off than without migrants' money in terms of liquidity risk -and durations -this paper has stressed the importance of assessing more carefully the role of migrants for the microfinance industry, as our results do not confirm what was expected from the literature on this issue.
